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Abstract  This  paper  analyzes  differences  in  target  leverage  and  speed  of  adjustment  across
three life  cycle  stages  of  European  listed  ﬁrms:  introduction,  growth  and  maturity.  We  deter-
mine that  proﬁtability  and  tangibility  are  the  most  stable  determinants,  whereas  growth
opportunities  and  size  exhibit  changing  effects  across  stages.  The  speed  of  adjustment  does
not increase  as  the  ﬁrms  evolve,  as  ﬁrms  in  introduction  are  able  to  adjust  the  fastest.  Firms
changing  stage  adjust  leverage  at  a  lower  speed,  and  their  target  is  more  affected  by  proﬁt-
ability, primarily  when  the  change  is  from  growth  to  maturity.  Finally,  we  conﬁrm  the  existence
of long-term  debt  targets,  by  providing  evidence  that  the  next-year  target  is  a  relevant  factorTarget  leverage;
Firm’s  life  cycle;
Speed  of  adjustment
to explain  current  debt  when  ﬁrms  change  from  one  stage  to  another.
© 2016  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ince  the  seminal  work  of  Fischer  et  al.  (1989), which  pro-
osed  a  model  of  dynamic  capital  structure  choice  consid-
ring  the  adjustment  costs,  target  leverage  has  become
n  important  concept  for  research  on  capital  structure.  In
ddition  to  the  identiﬁcation  of  the  determinants  of  the∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 987291737.
E-mail address: m.tascon@unileon.es (M.T. Tascón Fernández).
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).arget  leverage,  the  model  computes  the  speed  of  adjust-
ent  to  the  target.  Depending  on  the  cost  of  transactions
elative  to  the  changes  toward  the  new  capital  structure,
he  speed  of  adjustment  varies  across  companies  and  over
ime  (Hovakimian  et  al.,  2001).  Recent  papers  have  studied
he  target  leverage  as  a  function  of  ﬁrm-level  (Byoun,  2008;
hang  and  Dasgupta,  2009;  Hovakimian  and  Li,  2011;  Aybar-
rias  et  al.,  2012;  Faulkender  et  al.,  2012)  or  country-level
ariables  (Cook  and  Tang,  2010;  Rubio  and  Sogorb,  2011),  as
ell  as  in  relation  to  ﬁrms’  legal  and  institutional  environ-
ent  (González  and  González,  2008;  Öztekin  and  Flannery,
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FTarget  leverage  and  speed  of  adjustment  along  the  life  cycl
2012).  Our  work  adds  a  new  factor  to  this  growing  literature:
the  ﬁrm  life  cycle.
The  empirical  literature  suggests  the  existence  of  chang-
ing  patterns  of  capital  structure  across  the  life  stages
(La  Rocca  et  al.,  2011;  Teixeira  and  Santos,  2014)  and  a
time-varying  target  leverage  ratio  (Myers,  1984;  Elsas  and
Florysiak,  2011)  in  response  to  changing  circumstances  and
conditions.  Several  authors  (Hackbarth  et  al.,  2006;  Drobetz
et  al.,  2007)  exhibit  interesting  relations  between  the  speed
of  adjustment  and  well-known  business  cycle  variables,  indi-
cating  the  impact  of  macroeconomic  factors.  However,  there
is  no  empirical  evidence  about  the  capital  structure  adjust-
ment  along  the  life  cycle  of  the  ﬁrm.
After  using  a  classiﬁcation  model  partially  based  on
Dickinson  (2011)  that  allows  us  to  consider  the  compre-
hensive  behavior  of  the  ﬁrm  to  distinguish  between  ﬁrms
in  introduction,  growth  or  maturity,  we  investigate  a  panel
data  of  quoted  ﬁrms  from  fourteen  European  countries  to
analyze  their  target  determinants  and  their  speed  of  adjust-
ment  across  the  stages.
Our  work  makes  several  contributions.  First,  we  demon-
strate  that  the  main  factors  of  target  leverage  as  well  as
the  speed  of  adjustment  vary  along  the  stages  of  the  life
cycle.  Our  ﬁndings  suggest  that  ﬁrms  adjust  to  the  tar-
get  ratio  faster  during  introduction  than  during  growth  or
maturity.  Second,  we  observe  differential  effects  of  some
determinants  and  a  lower  speed  of  adjustment  in  ﬁrms
that  have  changed  stage.  We  attribute  this  result  to  the
increase  of  asymmetric  information  resulting  in  an  inten-
siﬁcation  of  transaction  costs.  Finally,  we  provide  evidence
that  next-stage  target  leverage  induces  the  level  of  current
leverage,  consistent  with  ﬁrms  involved  in  the  process  of
leverage  adjustment  previously  (in  advance)  to  carry  out
their  planned  investments.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  second
section  discusses  the  concepts  of  target  leverage,  adjust-
ment  speed,  life  cycle,  and  the  relation  between  them
to  derive  the  hypotheses  tested.  The  following  section
describes  the  research  design  including  the  measure  of  life
cycle,  the  dynamic  models  of  capital  structure,  the  factors
of  target  leverage,  and  the  methodology  used.  The  fourth
section  presents  the  sample  and  the  descriptive  statistics.
The  ﬁfth  section  discusses  empirical  results  and  robustness
checks.  Finally,  the  sixth  section  presents  the  conclusions.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
The  optimal  capital  structure  has  been  related  to  the  trade-
off  theory  (TOT),  as  it  poses  that  a  ﬁrm’s  target  leverage  is
driven  by  competing  forces  that  originate  the  beneﬁts  and
costs  of  debt,  mainly  the  agency  cost  of  ﬁnancial  distress  and
the  tax-deductibility  of  debt  ﬁnance  (Myers,  1977).  Under
this  dominant  explanation,  adjustment  costs  generate  lags
between  the  actual  debt  ratio  and  the  optimal  level  by  slow-
ing  down  the  speed  at  which  ﬁrms  adjust  deviations  (Myers,
1984;  Titman  and  Tsyplakov,  2007).  For  example,  if  there
are  ﬁxed  transactions  costs  for  issuing  or  retiring  debt,  a
ﬁrm  only  rebalances  when  its  debt  ratio  crosses  an  upper
or  lower  hurdle  (Fischer  et  al.,  1989).  Consistent  with  the
trade-off  reasoning,  the  following  factors  have  been  found
crucial  to  determine  the  speed  of  adjustment  (Elsas  and
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lorysiak,  2011): high  opportunity  costs  of  deviating  from
 target,  for  example,  in  ﬁrms  with  high  ﬁnancing  deﬁcits
r  in  small  ﬁrms;  and  high  default  risk.
However,  for  Shyam-Sunder  and  Myers  (1999),  the  exist-
nce  of  a target  debt  ratio  does  not  invalidate  the  pecking
rder  theory  (POT).  Flannery  and  Rangan  (2006)  ﬁnd  that
lthough  more  than  half  of  the  observed  changes  in  debt
atios  are  from  targeting  behavior,  pecking  order  consid-
rations  account  for  part  of  them  (less  than  10%).  Under
he  POT,  managers  do  not  attempt  to  maintain  a  particu-
ar  target;  instead,  the  leverage  ratio  is  deﬁned  as  the  gap
etween  operating  cash  ﬂows  and  investment  requirements
ver  time  (Barclay  and  Smith,  1999).  In  this  line,  Byoun’s
2008)  results  suggest  that  many  adjustments  occur  when
rms  have  above-target  debt  with  a  ﬁnancial  surplus  or
hen  they  have  below-target  debt  with  a  ﬁnancial  deﬁcit.
ovakimian  and  Li  (2009)  ﬁnd  asymmetric  adjustment  costs
epending  on  whether  the  ﬁrm  is  above  or  below  its  tar-
et  leverage.  They  ﬁnd  particularly  low  incremental  costs
hen  the  ﬁrm  pays  off  the  excess  debt  with  internal  funds.
onsistent  with  the  pecking  order  reasoning,  some  factors
ppear  as  crucial  to  determine  the  speed  of  adjustment:  the
evel  of  information  asymmetry  between  insiders  and  out-
iders  (Öztekin  and  Flannery,  2012);  a  variable  related  to
ebt  capacity,  size  (Drobetz  et  al.,  2007;  Aybar-Arias  et  al.,
012);  other  variables  indicating  current  or  future  additional
nvestments,  such  as  growth  (Drobetz  and  Wanzenried,
006;  Drobetz  et  al.,  2007)  or  growth  opportunities  (Aybar-
rias  et  al.,  2012);  and  cash  ﬂow  (Faulkender  et  al.,  2012).
We  argue  that  the  TOT  and  the  POT  change  their  preva-
ence  along  the  introduction,  growth,  and  maturity  stages
f  the  ﬁrm  life  cycle,  giving  rise  to  changing  patterns  of
oth  debt  targets  and  adjustment  speeds.  Costs  and  beneﬁts
f  adjusting  debt,  adduced  by  the  TOT,  such  as  bankruptcy
osts  and  tax  shields,  depend  on  ﬁrm-speciﬁc  factors  that
volve  along  life  cycles  as  the  ﬁrms  do.  Concerning  the  POT,
actors  behind  the  ﬁrm  ﬁnancing  needs,  ability  to  produce
ash  ﬂows,  ﬁnancing  alternatives,  debt  capacity,  and  infor-
ation  asymmetries  evolve  along  the  life  cycle  as  well.
arget  leverage  and  life  cycle
onsidering  the  trade-off  reasoning,  the  costs  and  ben-
ﬁts  of  debt  ﬁnancing  are  expected  to  change  over  the
ife  cycle,  thus  allowing  or  forcing  ﬁrms  to  modify  their
nancing  strategies.  As  ﬁrms  grow  and  develop,  they  are
sually  more  proﬁtable  and  have  more  tangible  assets  that
an  act  as  collateral  (Titman  and  Wessels,  1988),  whereas
heir  size  allows  them  to  be  more  diversiﬁed  (González
nd  González,  2008),  and  these  three  factors  contribute
o  a  reduction  in  bankruptcy  costs.  As  for  growth  oppor-
unities,  the  literature  attributes  this  factor  an  increase  of
ankruptcy  costs,  that  would  reduce  leverage  (Frank  and
oyal,  2009),  however,  some  authors  ﬁnd  that  ﬁrms  with
ore  growth  opportunities  have  relative  cost  advantages
n  external  growth  funding  (Drobetz  et  al.,  2007;  Elsas  and
lorysiak,  2011).  During  maturity,  the  trust  of  shareholders
nd  the  market  is  greater,  easing  the  transaction  of  these
rms  and  decreasing  their  costs  with  regard  to  the  growth
tage.  As  for  the  beneﬁts  of  debt,  the  possibility  of  using
ax  shields  effectively  varies  depending  on  net  income  or
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roﬁtability  (Frelinghaus  et  al.,  2005;  Pfaffermayr  et  al.,
013).  In  sum,  according  to  the  TOT,  taxes,  and  bankruptcy
osts  drive  more  proﬁtable  ﬁrms  toward  greater  leverage;
ather  low  bankruptcy  costs  through  collateralization  drive
rms  with  high  proportions  of  tangible  assets  toward  high
arget  leverage  ratios;  and  lower  probability  of  bankruptcy
hrough  higher  diversiﬁcation  drive  big  ﬁrms  toward  higher
everage  ratios.  Therefore,  as  transaction  costs  of  ﬁnancing
nd  bankruptcy  costs  decrease  whereas  more  tax  shields  can
e  used  effectively,  we  can  expect  a  higher  validity  of  the
OT  in  larger  and  more  mature  ﬁrms,  meaning  higher  target
everage  and  higher  levels  of  debt  for  these  types  of  ﬁrms,  in
ine  with  Frelinghaus  et  al.  (2005).  We  derive  our  hypothesis
.1a:
.1a.  As  ﬁrms  grow  and  mature,  proﬁtability,  size  and
angibles  become  stronger  positive  drivers  of  the  target
everage.
As  posed  by  the  POT,  the  information  asymmetries
etween  insiders  and  outsiders  tend  to  be  higher  during  the
arlier  stages  of  ﬁrm  life  cycles,  whereas  debt  capacity  is
ower  (Teixeira  and  Santos,  2014;  Pfaffermayr  et  al.,  2013).
n  line  with  González  and  González  (2012)  we  could  expect
he  POT  predictions  to  be  more  valid  during  introduction
nd  growth,1 when  the  information  asymmetry  is  higher.
tart-up  equity  ﬁnancing  should  become  more  probable  than
tart-up  debt  ﬁnancing  in  an  information  asymmetry  sce-
ario,  as  Hirsch  and  Walz  (2011)  ﬁnd  for  boom  periods,  when
conomies  and  industries  grow  rapidly.  On  the  one  hand,  fac-
ors  that  increase  as  the  ﬁrms  evolve,  such  as  age  or  size,
ndicate  bigger  debt  capacity  (due  to  know-how,  notoriety,
nd  collateral).  In  the  same  direction,  growth  and  growth
pportunities  indicate  more  fund  needs  (higher  investment
equirements).  On  the  other  hand,  during  growth  and  matu-
ity  ﬁrms  hold  cash  to  undertake  their  proﬁtable  investment
rojects  deprived  of  raising  outside  funds  at  high  transaction
osts  (Saddour,  2006).  In  sum,  according  to  the  POT,  higher
roﬁtability  enables  ﬁrms  to  use  less  debt;  low  information
symmetry  as  a  reason  of  less  costly  debt  issuances  drive
rms  with  more  tangible  assets  toward  greater  leverage;  and
now-how,  notoriety  and  collateral,  working  as  an  indication
f  debt  capacity  drive  ﬁrms  with  bigger  size  toward  higher
everage  ratios.  Therefore,  the  POT  supports  the  hypothe-
is  H.1a  in  respect  to  size  and  tangibles  but  an  additional
ypothesis  H.1b  is  derived.2
.1b.  As  ﬁrms  grow  and  mature,  proﬁtability  contributes
s  a  stronger  negative  driver  of  target  leverage.Finally,  from  Jalilvand  and  Harris  (1984),  a  number  of
orks  allude  to  long-run  target  capital  structures,  ﬁnding
hat  the  rate  of  annual  convergence  toward  the  target  is
1 González and González (2012) pose their hypothesis in terms of
rm size instead of distinguishing between life cycle stages. There-
ore, for these authors the validity of the predictions of the POT is
egatively related to ﬁrm size.
2 Note that H.1b, posed according to the POT, predicts an opposite
ehavior for proﬁtability as a driver of the target leverage than
.1a, posed according to the TOT.
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ower  than  40%  for  the  typical  ﬁrm  (Flannery  and  Rangan,
006;  Huang  and  Ritter,  2009)  or  lower  than  20%  once  the
ethodological  bias  has  been  avoided  (Hovakimian  and  Li,
009).  Furthermore,  Leary  and  Roberts  (2005)  attribute  to
ome  ﬁrm  shocks  lasting  effects  despite  active  rebalancing.
n  this  line,  we  have  considered  the  magnitude  of  invest-
ents  when  a  large  ﬁrm  changes  from  one  stage  to  another.
or  listed  ﬁrms,  the  process  to  adjust  the  current  capital
tructure  to  the  future  target  may  be  longer  than  a  period.
his  is  consistent  with  a relevant  fraction  of  major  ﬁnan-
ing  transactions  associated  with  adjustments  away  from
he  target  or  adjustments  beyond  the  target,  even  in  cases
n  which  the  speeds  of  adjustment  are  substantially  higher
Hovakimian  and  Li,  2009).  In  line  with  the  possible  use  of
he  ﬁnancial  structure  to  sign  higher  expected  performance3
n  the  next  future  (Ross,  1977),  those  drivers  concerned  by
he  improved  expected  returns,  such  as  proﬁtability,  size,  or
angibles  could  shift  the  intensity  or  even  the  sign  of  their
ffect  on  the  current  leverage  when  future  values  are  taken
nstead  of  the  current  values.  Given  that  the  capital  struc-
ure  is  the  ﬁrst  decision  a  ﬁrm  has  to  take  before  starting
 new  investment  project,  we  hypothesize  that  during  the
eriod  previous  to  a  changing  of  life  stage,  the  ﬁrm’s  lever-
ge  is  not  only  explained  by  the  contemporaneous  target  but
y  the  target  leverage  of  the  next  stage,  leading  to  a  new
ypothesis  not  previously  tested  in  this  line  of  research.
.2.  When  the  ﬁrm  changes  from  one  stage  to  another,  the
arget  leverage  of  the  next  stage  is  an  explanatory  factor  of
he  current  capital  structure.
peed  of  adjustment  and  life  cycle
nlike  the  previous  works,  we  study  the  speed  of  adjustment
o  target  leverage  in  a  dynamic  way  by  taking  into  consid-
ration  how  the  speed  of  adjustment  changes  by  life  cycle
tages  and  how  the  speed  changes  when  ﬁrms  evolve  from
ne  stage  to  another.  Considering  the  trade-off  reasoning,
uring  introduction,  transaction  costs  are  higher  because
f  the  limited  possibilities  of  ﬁnancing,  as  they  have  not
rojected  a  fully  reliable  and  strong  position  in  the  mar-
et.  During  growth,  additional  needs  of  external  ﬁnancing
Saddour,  2006) and/or  bargaining  ﬁght  (Delmas  and  Marcus,
004)  may  generate  transaction  costs,  though  ﬁrms  with
ore  growth  opportunities  have  relative  cost  advantages
n  external  growth  funding  (Drobetz  et  al.,  2007;  Elsas  and
lorysiak,  2011)  and  adjust  faster.  During  maturity,  ﬁrms  can
hoose  among  alternative  types  of  ﬁnancing,  which  implies
ower  transaction  costs,  such  as  the  cost  of  paying  dividends
o  a  wider  number  of  shareholders  or  the  cost  of  issuing
onds  to  a wider  number  of  bondholders;  furthermore,  they
requently  have  less  cash  ﬂow  volatility  which  decreases  the
ossible  costs  of  distress  increasing  the  expected  speed  of
djustment.  Consistent  with  this  reasoning,  Hovakimian  and
i  (2009)  identify  ﬁrms  in  the  highest  maturity  debt  group
s  the  ones  with  the  highest  speed  of  adjustment.
3 Changes in the ﬁnancial structure alter the external perception
f the ﬁrm’s risk. The higher bankruptcy costs derived from the
everage increase implies that the managers are discouraged to give
alse signals on the future expected returns (Ross, 1977).
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Table  1  Life  cycle  stage  model.
Panel  A.  Dickinson  model  for  introduction,  growth  and  maturity
Cash ﬂow  type  Introduction  Growth  Mature
Operating  −  +  +
Investing −  −  −
Financing +  +  −
Panel B.  Modiﬁed  Dickinson  model  for  introduction,  growth  and  maturity
Introduction  Growth  Mature
Operating  CF −  +  +
Investing CF −  −  −
Growth-risk  (Growth  Decile  +  Risk  Decile)/2 (Growth  Decile  +  Risk  Decile)/2
st  be
(Growth  Decile  +  Risk  Decile)/2
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the  ﬁrst  three:  introduction,  growth  and  maturity,4 as  pre-
sented  in  Table  1  (Panel  A),  considering  only  what  concerns
the  operating  and  investing  activities.must  be  ≥5 mu
Both  Hackbarth  et  al.  (2006)  and  Drobetz  et  al.  (2007)
relate  the  speed  to  the  economic  cycle.  Using  common
business  cycle  variables  linked  to  the  current  or  future
state  of  the  economy,  they  conclude  that  the  adjustment
is  faster  during  booms  than  in  recession  periods,  that  is,
with  low  interest  rates  and  negligible  risks  of  disruption  in
the  global  ﬁnancial  system.  They  attribute  their  results  to
the  importance  of  these  determinants  of  default  risk.  There-
fore,  the  fewer  transaction  costs  of  ﬁnancing  and  the  fewer
bankruptcy  costs  during  maturity  lead  to  our  third  hypothe-
sis:
H.3.  As  ﬁrms  mature,  an  increase  of  the  speed  of  adjust-
ment  is  expected.
Concerning  the  POT,  as  growth  starts  leveling  off  during
maturity  earnings  and  cash  ﬂows  will  continue  to  increase
rapidly,  reﬂecting  past  investments,  but  the  investment  in
new  projects  will  decline,  decreasing  the  ﬁnancing  needs.
Larger  ﬁrms  often  have  lower  information  asymmetry,  which
would  indicate  a  lower  cost  of  ﬁnancing  and  faster  adjust-
ment.  Thus,  better  analyst  coverage  reduces  information
asymmetry  upon  announcement  of  debt  or  equity  issues
(Hovakimian  and  Li,  2009).  In  this  line,  Bulan  and  Yan  (2010)
ﬁnd  that  the  POT  better  explains  the  ﬁnancing  decisions
of  mature  ﬁrms  compared  to  growth  ﬁrms.  Therefore,  the
pecking  order  reasoning  provides  us  with  factors  pushing  the
speed  of  adjustment  up.  Lower  information  asymmetry  and
ﬁnancing  needs  reduce  adjustment  costs,  favoring  a  higher
speed  of  adjustment  and  reinforcing  our  third  hypothesis.
However,  ﬁrms  changing  from  one  stage  to  another  will
suffer  higher  levels  of  information  asymmetry  between  the
ﬁrm  managers  and  the  ﬁnancing  market,  generating  higher
transaction  costs.  Both,  the  change  from  introduction  to
growth  and  the  change  from  growth  to  maturity,  take  place
in  a  period  for  which  the  ﬁrm’s  information  talks  about  the
previous  situation  when  the  ﬁrm’s  managers  need  ﬁnancing
for  the  following  stage.  The  information  asymmetry  con-
cerns  the  variations  of  risk,  proﬁtability  and  generation  of
cash  ﬂows,  from  one  stage  to  another.  Furthermore,  for  ﬁrms
that  change  from  introduction  to  growth,  certain  transac-
tion  costs  such  as  those  stemming  from  cash  ﬂow  volatility
are  expected  to  be  higher  than  for  ﬁrms  that  advance  from
growth  to  maturity.  Consequently,  the  speed  of  adjustment t ≥5 must  be  <5
hould  be  slower  in  the  last  case.  Hence,  we  pose  two  new
ypotheses:
.4a.  During  the  year  in  which  ﬁrms  change  to  the  subse-
uent  stage,  the  speed  of  adjustment  is  lower  than  for  ﬁrms
emaining  in  the  same  stage.
.4b.  The  speed  of  adjustment  is  faster  for  ﬁrms  chang-
ng  from  growth  to  maturity  than  for  ﬁrms  changing  from
ntroduction  to  growth.
Note  that  hypotheses  H.4a  and  H.4b  concern  only  those
rms  classiﬁed  in  different  stages  in  two  consecutive
eriods.  The  speed  of  adjustment  would  be  lower  during
he  transition  to  a  new  stage,  showing  a lack  of  linearity  in
espect  to  the  evolution  of  the  speed  posed  by  the  previ-
us  hypothesis  H.3.  For  example,  in  accordance  with  H.3,
 higher  speed  of  adjustment  is  expected  for  mature  ﬁrms
han  for  ﬁrms  in  the  growth  stage,  but,  according  to  H.4a,
 lower  speed  of  adjustment  is  expected  in  the  transition
eriod  from  growth  to  maturity.
esearch design
easure  of  life  cycle
o  consider  different  aspects  of  the  business  by  assigning
rms  to  the  proper  stage  of  their  life  cycle,  we  have  started
rom  the  model  by  Dickinson  (2011)  previously  used  by
astro  et  al.  (2015)  in  a  capital  structure  context.  Dickinson
2011)  empirically  demonstrates  that,  consistent  with  the-
ry,  proﬁtability  and  growth  differ  as  the  ﬁrm  progress
hrough  life  stages  taking  into  consideration  the  signs  of  the
perating,  investing  and  ﬁnancing  cash  ﬂows  disclosed  in  the
ash  Flow  Statement.  The  combinations  of  these  signs  allow
s  to  establish  ﬁve  possible  stages,  of  which  we  focus  on4 We  have to consider that shake-out is a difﬁcult stage to delimi-
ate, and companies move into decline directly from a lower stage.
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debt  in  current  liabilities  plus  long-term  debt  plus  pre-92  
Given  that  our  study  concerns  the  evolution  of  ﬁrm  lever-
ge  across  the  life  cycle,  and  the  Dickinson  model  includes
nancial  cash  ﬂows  (combined  with  operating  and  invest-
ng  cash  ﬂows)  to  discriminate  between  the  life  cycle  stage
n  which  the  ﬁrms  are  classiﬁed,  an  endogeneity  problem
ould  bias  the  results.  In  order  to  avoid  this  potential  prob-
em,  we  have  discarded  that  part  of  the  Dickinson  model
hat  uses  ﬁnancial  cash  ﬂows.  Therefore,  as  this  third  type
f  cash  ﬂows  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  ﬁrms  in
rowth  and  maturity  stages,  as  well  as  to  distinguish  ﬁrms
n  the  shake-out  stage  against  ﬁrms  in  any  other  stage,  we
ave  introduced  an  alternative  discriminant  criterion,  based
n  previous  empirical  literature  (Table  1,  Panel  B).  The  new
riterion  combines  two  relevant  factors  in  life  cycle  theory:
rowth  and  risk,  especially  discriminant  for  the  introduc-
ion/growth  stages  against  the  maturity  stage.5 The  ﬁrst
iscriminant  factor  is  growth  because  relatively  young  ﬁrms
re  fast  growing  (Mueller,  1972)  both  in  sales  and  assets
Miller  and  Friesen,  1984),  considering  for  this  study  the
rowth  of  sales  with  respect  to  the  previous  year.  The  second
iscriminant  measure  is  risk,  which  is  found  to  be  remark-
bly  higher  during  the  birth,  growth  and  revival  stages,  in
ontrast  with  the  more  conservative  maturity  and  decline
tages  (Miller  and  Friesen,  1984).  In  this  study,  we  use  the
early  standard  deviation  of  monthly  returns.  Then,  we  con-
ider  the  joint  effect  of  these  variables.  We  calculate  the
ecile  of  the  risk  and  growth  variables  by  year  and  country.
hen,  we  create  a  new  variable  that  takes  the  average  value
f  the  deciles  in  which  these  two  factors  are  placed.  Conse-
uently,  the  ﬁrm  is  in  the  introduction  or  growth  stage  when
he  resulting  value  is  equal  or  higher  than  5;  meanwhile,  it
s  in  the  maturity  stage  when  the  value  is  lower  than  5.
ynamic  models  of  capital  structure
e  have  used  a  target  adjustment  model  in  the  line  proposed
y  Miguel  and  Pindado  (2001),  which  takes  into  account  the
ole  of  transaction  costs  when  ﬁrms  change  their  debt  level
nd  furthermore  computes  the  target  debt  level  as  a  func-
ion  of  the  determining  factors  of  capital  structure.  The
odel  tests  how  quickly  the  debt  level  (Dit−1)  moves  toward
he  target  (D∗it)  in  one  period.
Dit −  Dit−1)  =  ˛(D∗it −  Dit−1)  (1)
The  transaction  costs  impede  ﬁrms  from  fully  adjusting
heir  levels  of  indebtedness  to  the  target  level.  Therefore,
he  coefﬁcient  ˛  varies  between  0  and  1  and  is  inversely
elated  to  adjustment  costs.  In  the  extremes,  ﬁrms  com-
letely  adjust  their  leverage  to  the  optimal  level  (˛  =  1)
5 Although operating cash ﬂows allow us to distinguish between
rms in the introduction and ﬁrms in the growth stage, without
onsidering the ﬁnancial cash ﬂows all the ﬁrms could be classiﬁed
lso into the shake-out stage. By applying the additional criterion
that replaces the ﬁnancial cash ﬂows) to the whole sample, we dis-
ard a number of ﬁrms that considering only operating and investing
ash ﬂows had been classiﬁed into the introduction or the growth
tages, but in coherence with the discriminant power of the risk and
he growth factors explained by the life cycle theory, they should
e considered into the shake-out stage, not analyzed in the current
tudy.
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hen  transaction  costs  are  zero;  on  the  contrary,  transac-
ion  costs  may  be  so  high  that  no  ﬁrm  adjusts  its  debt  level
˛  =  0),  maintaining  the  previous  debt  level.
it =  ˛D∗it +  (1  −  ˛)Dit−1 (2)
Following  González  and  González  (2008)  and  Rajan  and
ingales  (1995),  proﬁtability  (PROF), growth  opportunities
GROWTH),  tangible  assets  (TANG)  and  size  are  included  in
he  model  as  determinants  of  the  target  debt.
∗
it =  a0 +  a1PROFit +  a2GROWTHit +  a3TANGit +  a4SIZEit
+  it (3)
it =  ˛[a0 +  a1PROFit +  a2GROWTHit +  a3TANGit +  a4SIZEit
+  it]  +  (1  −  ˛)Dit−1 (4)
it =  ˛a0 +  (1  −  ˛)Dit−1 +  ˛a1PROFit +  ˛a2GROWTHit
+  ˛a3TANGit +  ˛a4SIZEit +
m∑
k=1
Sk +
m∑
k=1
Ck +
2012∑
t=1990
Yt
+  i +  it (5)
here  Dit is  the  leverage  of  ﬁrm  i  in  year  t,  ˛0 is  the  indepen-
ent  term  and  a  are  the  coefﬁcients  of  the  variables  taken
s  explanatory  factors,  Sk is  the  set  of  49  sector  dummies
o  control  for  sector  effects  based  on  the  Fama  and  French
ndustry  classiﬁcation,6 Ck is  the  set  of  country  dummy  varia-
les  controlling  for  other  aspects  beyond  those  explicitly
ncluded  in  the  equation,  and  Yt is  a  set  of  time  dummy
ariables  for  each  year  capturing  any  unobserved  ﬁrm  time
ffect  not  included  in  the  regression.   i is  the  ﬁrm  effect,
hich  is  assumed  to  be  constant  for  ﬁrm  i  over  t;  and  it
s  the  error  term.  In  our  empirical  analysis,  we  run  several
roups  of  regressions  using  diverse  combinations  of  these
ariables.
Our  proxy  for  leverage  is  the  ratio  of  total  debt  (long
erm  debt  plus  short  term  debt)  to  total  assets,  in  book
alues.7 Proﬁtability  is  computed  as  the  ratio  of  earnings
efore  interest,  taxes,  depreciation,  depletion,  and  amorti-
ation  over  total  assets.  Growth  opportunities  is  the  market
o  book  ratio,  deﬁned  as  the  market  value  of  equity  pluserred  stocks  minus  deferred  taxes  and  investment  tax  credit
ver  total  assets.  We  proxy  tangible  assets  by  the  rate  of
6 Vid. Fama and French (1997) and the web page of Kenneth
rench at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
rench/Data Library/det 49 ind port.html.
7 We  have selected book leverage for several reasons. The ﬁrst
ne concerns the relevant role of proﬁtability in our study. Consid-
ring the effect of proﬁtability on the market value of assets, there
re some predicted relations for accounting leverage that are not
o clear when using market leverage, such as the effect of proﬁt-
bility for the trade-off theory (Fama and French, 2002). Second,
t has been found that book leverage is a more stable measure over
he decades than market leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2008). Finally,
tock returns adjust when the ﬁnancing mix changes, thus biasing
he market debt ratio (Chang and Dasgupta, 2009).
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being  higher  for  ﬁrms  during  growth  and  maturity  than  for
introduction  ﬁrms.  The  mean  proﬁtability  of  6.8%  hides
strong  differences  between  the  negative  mean  for  ﬁrms  in
introduction  and  around  12%  during  growth  and  maturity.
Proﬁtability  is  higher  for  ﬁrms  changing  stage  (Table  2,  Panel
B).  Property,  plant  and  equipment  to  total  assets,  and  size
8 There are two reasons to select quoted ﬁrms for our study: (1)
the Dickinson model is generally applicable only to ﬁrms issuing the
Cash Flow Statement, and this is not mandatory for a main part
of non-quoted ﬁrms; and (2) the deﬁnition of the life cycle stages
may vary considerably for quoted vs. non-quoted ﬁrms, specially
concerning introduction and growth.Target  leverage  and  speed  of  adjustment  along  the  life  cycl
property,  plant,  and  equipment  over  total  assets  (TANG).
Finally,  size  is  measured  as  the  logarithm  of  total  assets.
To  consider  the  life  cycle  of  the  ﬁrm  jointly  with  this
dynamic  model  of  capital  structure,  we  test  the  model
for  the  group  of  companies  placed  inside  the  introduction,
growth,  and  maturity  stages.  According  to  the  classiﬁcation
criteria  explained  in  the  section  ‘‘Measure  of  life  cycle’’,
we  select  the  speciﬁc  group  of  ﬁrms  belonging  to  each  stage
when  needed  to  applying  the  models.  Thus,  we  test  if  the
different  ﬁnancing  strategies  of  the  ﬁrm  across  the  stages
change  the  drivers’  effect  on  the  target  and  modify  the
speed  of  adjustment.
Concerning  the  second  and  fourth  hypotheses,  we  study
how  the  next-year  target  leverage  affects  the  current  debt
and  how  the  speed  of  adjustment  varies  when  the  ﬁrms
change  of  stage.  We  run  the  regression  with  ﬁve  differ-
ent  samples  depending  on  the  situation  of  the  ﬁrms  in  two
consecutive  years:  ﬁrms  remaining  in  introduction,  ﬁrms
changing  from  introduction  to  growth,  ﬁrms  remaining  in
growth,  ﬁrms  changing  from  growth  to  maturity,  and  ﬁrms
remaining  in  maturity.
To  test  the  second  hypothesis,  we  model  current  debt  as
a  function  of  the  next-year  target  instead  of  the  contempo-
raneous  target.  The  modiﬁed  model  is  as  follows:
Dit =  ˛  ·  D∗it+1 +  (1  −  ˛)Dit−1 (6)
D∗it+1 =  a0 +  a1PROFit+1 +  a2GROWTHit+1 +  a3TANGit+1
+  a4SIZEit+1 +  it (7)
Dit =  ˛[a0 +  a1PROFit+1 +  a2GROWTHit+1 +  a3TANGit+1
+  a4SIZEit+1]  +  (1  −  ˛)Dit−1 +
m∑
k=1
Sk +
m∑
k=1
Ck +
2012∑
t=1992
Yt
+  i +  it (8)
We  use  the  panel  data  methodology  to  alleviate  the
endogeneity  concerns  driven  by  unobservable  heterogene-
ity;  our  models  are  estimated  by  using  a  more  advanced
method  of  GMM  (Arellano,  2003;  Baltagi,  2005;  Wooldridge,
2002),  speciﬁcally  the  two-step  GMM  estimator,  included
in  the  xtabond2  Stata  routine  written  by  Roodman  (2009)
that  uses  one-step  residuals  to  construct  the  asymptotically
optimal  weighting  matrix  and  addresses  the  heterogeneity
and  endogeneity  problems.  The  GMM  estimator  addresses
the  heterogeneity  problem  by  modeling  it  as  an  individ-
ual  effect,  which  is  removed  by  taking  ﬁrst  differences  of
the  variables  used  in  the  regression.  Also,  GMM  shows  its
efﬁciency  by  adding  new  nonlinear  functions  of  the  exoge-
nous  variables  to  the  instruments  (Hsiao,  2003).  Besides,  the
endogeneity  problem  is  mitigated  by  using  the  lags  of  all
the  right-hand  side  variables.  As  explained  in  the  previous
section,  we  use  predetermined  variables  that  have  been  car-
ried  out  using  the  system  GMM  in  panel  data,  developed  by
Arellano  and  Bover  (1995)  and  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998).
We  use  the  m  statistic,  which  tests  for  lack  of  second-
order  serial  correlation  in  the  two  ﬁrst-difference  residuals,
as  this  condition  is  required  for  the  proper  functioning  of
the  estimator.  An  additional  test  of  speciﬁcation  used  is
the  Hansen’s  statistic  of  over-identifying  restrictions,  which
a
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ests  for  the  absence  of  correlation  between  the  instruments
nd  the  error  term.  The  use  of  panel  data  improves  the  efﬁ-
iency  of  econometric  estimates  and  is  more  ﬂexible  in  the
hoice  of  variables  to  be  used  as  instruments  to  control  for
ndogeneity.
ample and descriptive analysis
ample
n  our  analysis,  we  have  used  ﬁrm  balance-sheet,  income-
tatement  and  cash-ﬂow-statement  annual  data  from
orldscope  database.  As  indicated  in  Table  1,  the  signs
f  the  Worldscope  variables  ‘Net  Cash  Flow,  Operating
ctivities’  and  ‘Net  Cash  Flow,  Investing’,  jointly  with  a  com-
lementary  criterion  concerning  growth  and  risk,  allow  us
o  assign  ﬁrms  into  the  three  life  cycle  stages  studied.  The
ash  ﬂow  statement  is  generally  not  available  prior  to  1989.
herefore,  our  sample  covers  the  period  1990--2012.  The
anel  data  contain  all  quoted8 ﬁrms  from  Austria,  Belgium,
enmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Nether-
ands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden  and  UK  (11,553
rm-year  observations).  The  sample  is  made  up  of  the  main
uropean  countries  as  regards  the  number  of  listed  ﬁrms.
o  test  the  ﬁrst  and  the  third  hypotheses,  we  take  all
hose  ﬁrms  classiﬁed  into  the  introduction,  the  growth  or
he  maturity  stages,  according  to  the  classiﬁcation  criteria9
xplained  in  the  section  ‘‘Measure  of  life  cycle’’.  For  our
econd,  and  fourth  hypotheses,  we  work  with  ﬁve  sub-
amples,  ﬁrms  that  change  from  introduction  to  growth
453  ﬁrm-year  observations),  ﬁrms  that  move  from  growth
o  maturity  (1363  ﬁrm-year  observations)  and  ﬁrms  that
aintain  in  the  same  stage  (837  ﬁrm-year  observations  in
ntroduction;  2700  in  growth;  and  1683  in  maturity).  We
xclude  ﬁnancial  and  regulated  ﬁrms  (SIC  codes  6000--6999
nd  4900--4999)  from  the  sample.  Moreover,  we  winsorize  all
ariables  at  the  3%  level  to  avoid  the  inﬂuence  of  outliers.
escriptive  statistics
able  2  reports  the  descriptive  statistics  by  life  cycle  stage.
he  total  sample  indicates  a mean  leverage  ratio  of  20.6%;9 Firms that would be classiﬁed into the shake-out or the decline
re discarded; for example, those ﬁrms with both operating and
nvesting cash ﬂows positive, and those ones with negative operat-
ng cash ﬂows and positive investing cash ﬂows.
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics.  General.
Panel  A.  Descriptive  statistics
Life  cycle  Variable  Obs.  Firms  Mean  St.  Dev.  Median  Min.  Max.
Introduction  TDEBT  2189  1013  0.190  0.209  0.120  0.000  0.703
PROF 2189  1013  −0.159  0.238  −0.089  −0.555  0.330
GROWTH 2189  1013  2.059  1.934  1.227  0.232  6.971
TANG 2189  1013  0.178  0.205  0.096  0.000  0.875
SIZE 2189  1013  10.101  1.854  9.896  7.373  17.161
Growth TDEBT 5541  2007  0.210  0.175  0.189  0.000  0.703
PROF 5541  2007  0.119  0.112  0.121  −0.555  0.330
GROWTH 5541  2007  1.300  1.136  0.934  0.232  6.971
TANG 5541 2007  0.285 0.236 0.237  0.000  0.875
SIZE 5541  2007  12.165 2.079 12.057 7.373 17.161
Mature TDEBT 3823  1532  0.209  0.169  0.187  0.000  0.703
PROF 3823  1532  0.122  0.096  0.122  −0.555  0.330
GROWTH 3823  1532  1.149  0.873  0.923  0.232  6.971
TANG 3823  1532  0.310  0.232  0.271  0.000  0.875
SIZE 3823  1532  12.719  2.239  12.456  7.373  17.161
Total TDEBT 11,553  2681  0.206  0.180  0.177  0.000  0.703
PROF 11,553  2681  0.068  0.178  0.104  −0.555  0.330
GROWTH 11,553  2681  1.394  1.299  0.966  0.232  6.971
TANG 11,553  2681  0.273  0.234  0.217  0.000  0.875
SIZE 11,553  2681  11.958  2.291  11.823  7.373  17.161
Panel B.  Mean  differences
Mean  diff.  (Growth
minus  Introduction)
Mean  diff.  (Maturity
minus  Growth)
Mean  diff.  (Stage  Change
minus  Unchange)
TDEBT  0.0202*** −0.000949  0.00706
PROF 0.278*** 0.00332  0.0261***
GROWTH  −0.759*** −0.151*** −0.215***
TANG  0.107*** 0.0250*** −0.0124
SIZE 2.064*** 0.554*** 0.0569
Notes: TDEBT is book leverage (total debt/total assets); PROF is proﬁtability (EBITDA/total assets); GROWTH is market to book (market
value of equity + debt in current liabilities + long-term debt + preferred stocks − deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets);
TANG is tangibility (property, plant and equipment/assets); and SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Mean dif. indicates the difference
of means test (t-test).
*Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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xhibit  growing  numbers  across  the  stages,  as  expected,
n  line  with  La  Rocca  et  al.  (2011).  By  contrast,  growth
pportunities  exhibit  a  sound  decreasing  pattern  as  the  ﬁrms
volve,  as  in  La  Rocca  et  al.  (2011)  and  Teixeira  and  Santos
2014).
In the  Appendix  we  show  the  correlation  matrix  and
he  VIF  factors  (Panels  A  and  B).  Looking  to  these  corre-
ations  and  some  untabulated  results  by  stage,  tangibility
nd  size  appear  as  the  most  important  factors  for  lever-
ge.  According  to  much  of  the  previous  empirical  evidence,
ebt  ratios  are  positively  correlated  with  size  and  tangibil-
ty  in  the  three  stages  studied,  and  negatively  correlated
ith  proﬁtability  in  the  growth  and  maturity  stages  (even
hough  the  general  sign  in  the  Appendix  is  positive).  The
aximum  value  for  the  relation  with  proﬁtability  appears
uring  growth.  Remarkable  differences  can  be  appreciated
long  the  life  cycle  of  the  ﬁrm.  All  VIF  factors  indicate
s
b
a
ihe  absence  of  multicollinearity  between  the  independent
ariables.
esults
mpirical  results
able  3  compares  the  results  on  the  determinants  of  ﬁrm
everage  and  the  speed  of  adjustment  across  the  three  life
ycle  stages  studied.  In  this  table,  we  observe  that  the
raditional  determinants  of  capital  structure  are  signiﬁcant
rivers  of  the  target  leverage,  but  coefﬁcients,  signs,  and
igniﬁcance  change  along  the  three  stages.  The  most  sta-
le  factors  of  target  leverage  from  introduction  to  maturity
re  proﬁtability  and  tangible  assets.  Growth  opportunities
s  a relevant  determinant  but  shows  changes  of  signs  across
Target  leverage  and  speed  of  adjustment  along  the  life  cycle  195
Table  3  By-stage  determinants  of  ﬁrm  leverage.  System  GMM.
Variables  All  ﬁrms  Introduction  Growth  Maturity
TDEBTt−1 0.599*** 0.537*** 0.706*** 0.661***
[0.00778]  [0.00327]  [0.0198]  [0.00246]
PROFt −0.122*** −0.0266*** −0.172*** −0.161***
[0.00680]  [0.00118]  [0.0274]  [0.00148]
GROWTHt 0.00190** −0.00319*** −0.00719*** 0.00978***
[0.000757]  [0.000161]  [0.00241]  [0.000113]
TANGt 0.183*** 0.228*** 0.0985*** 0.0710***
[0.00759]  [0.00482]  [0.0220]  [0.00165]
SIZEt 0.0120*** −0.0131*** 0.00951*** 0.0118***
[0.000966]  [0.000755]  [0.00269]  [0.000345]
Constant −0.0761*** −0.574 −0.0732 −0.0634***
[0.0143]  [0.632]  [0.0786]  [0.0177]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 11,553  2189  5541  3823
Firms 2681  1013  2007  1532
F Test  783.5  776,536  95.89  29,394
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0  0
Hansen Test  682  486.8  217.5  765.2
Sig. Hansen  0.335  0.999  0.129  0.361
m2 1.444  0.337  1.234  −0.344
Sig. m2 0.149  0.736  0.217  0.731
Notes: Regressions are estimated using the system GMM estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. TDEBT is book leverage
(total debt/total assets); PROF is proﬁtability (EBITDA/total assets); GROWTH is market to book (market value of equity + debt in current
liabilities + long-term debt + preferred stocks − deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets); TANG is tangibility (property,
plant and equipment/assets); and SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error is in
brackets.
*The signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** The signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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stages,  in  line  with  the  results  obtained  by  González  and
González  (2012)  for  small,  medium-size,  and  large  ﬁrms.
Regarding  size,  it  is  the  factor  with  stronger  inﬂuence  on
the  level  of  debt  in  our  study,  even  though  the  sign  changes
across  the  stages,  showing  a  lack  of  linearity,  in  accordance
with  the  different  behavior  found  by  González  and  González
for  the  debt  determinants  across  different  sizes  of  ﬁrms.
Our  results  are  consistent  with  economic  changes  and  corpo-
rate  actions  moving  ﬁrms  either  away  or  toward  their  target
(Titman  and  Tsyplakov,  2007);  however,  it  is  consistent  with
the  leverage  target  varying  in  response  to  the  evolution  of
market  imperfections,  such  as  taxes,  ﬁnancial  distress  costs
(TOT),  or  asymmetric  information  (POT).
Proﬁtability  exhibits  a  negative  contribution  to  the  tar-
get  leverage,  in  line  with  the  most  common  result  in  the
previous  literature.  According  to  our  results,  the  POT  would
support  the  behavior  of  leverage  with  respect  to  proﬁtabil-
ity  along  the  three  life  stages  considered,  suggesting  that
higher  proﬁtability  increases  retained  earnings,  thus  reduc-
ing  the  target  debt.  The  higher  values  during  growth  and
maturity  conﬁrm  our  hypothesis  H.1b.
High  growth  opportunities  during  pre-mature  stages
of  the  life  cycle  usually  involve  new  projects  (much
better  known  by  insiders),  indicating  higher  information
t
l
rsymmetry.  Thus,  during  earlier  stages,  the  access  to  new
xternal  ﬁnancing  is  hampered,  and  ﬁrms  are  forced  to
se  capital  or  retained  earnings.  In  addition,  low  current
ree  cash  ﬂows  imply  little  need  of  debt  to  provide  a  tax
hield  or  to  control  managerial  spending.  On  the  other  hand,
rowth  opportunities  increase  both  debt  capacity  and  fund-
ng  needs.  During  the  introduction  stage,  the  negative  sign
uggests  that  ﬁrms  can  ﬁnance  their  new  investments  with
apital,  as  the  proﬁtability  rate  is  negative.  During  the
rowth  stage,  the  negative  sign  points  to  the  use  of  cap-
tal  or  retained  earnings  to  ﬁnance  the  new  investments
ithout  using  additional  debt.  During  maturity,  the  posi-
ive  coefﬁcient  for  growth  opportunities  indicates  higher
ebt  capacity  and  lower  asymmetric  information.  The  small
oefﬁcients  are  consistent  with  growth  opportunities  exert-
ng  opposite  effects  on  leverage.  The  mixed  evidence  found
or  growth  opportunities  in  previous  works  (González  and
onzález,  2008) would  be  explained  by  heterogeneous  sam-
les  made  up  of  ﬁrms  in  different  stages  of  their  life  cycles,
s  well  as  by  the  mentioned  opposite  forces  in  place  during
he  stages.
As  for  tangible  assets,  we  obtain  a  positive  relation  with
everage,  indicating  the  effect  of  tangibles  as  collateral  to
educe  costs  of  distress  and  debt-related  agency  problems.
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Table  4  Determinants  of  ﬁrm  leverage  according  to  the  stage  change.  System  GMM.
Variables  Introduction:
Unchange
Change:  Intro
to  Growth
Growth:
Unchange
Change
Growth-Mat
Maturity:
Unchange
TDEBTt−1 0.533*** 0.740*** 0.595*** 0.704*** 0.686***
[0.00300]  [0.0244]  [0.0108]  [0.00184]  [0.00104]
PROFt −0.0324*** −0.232*** −0.201*** −0.237*** −0.185***
[0.00221]  [0.0208]  [0.0126]  [0.00179]  [0.00170]
GROWTHt 0.00120*** 0.0102*** 0.00166  0.0155*** 0.0158***
[0.000219]  [0.00240]  [0.00104]  [0.000145]  [0.000169]
TANGt 0.202*** 0.170*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.102***
[0.0104]  [0.0259]  [0.0134]  [0.00223]  [0.00145]
SIZEt −0.00699*** 0.00172  0.0185*** 0.00848*** 0.00952***
[0.000842]  [0.00247]  [0.00177]  [0.000454]  [0.000204]
Constant 0  0.145  −0.179*** −0.0326*** 0.0725
[0] [0.468]  [0.0365]  [0.0108]  [0.0548]
Industry Eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 837  453  2700  1363  1683
Firms 437  395  1230  977  821
F Test  49,073  3254  187.9  4.373e+06  1.520e+07
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0  0  0
Hansen Test  378  130.2  406.4  652.6  582.7
Sig. Hansen  1  0.972  0.0664  0.769  1
m2 −1.102  −0.295  1.978  1.570  0.205
Sig. m2 0.270  0.768  0.0480  0.116  0.838
Notes: Regressions are estimated using the system GMM estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. TDEBT is book leverage
(total debt/total assets); PROF is proﬁtability (EBITDA/total assets); GROWTH is market to book (market value of equity + debt in current
liabilities + long-term debt + preferred stocks − deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets); TANG is tangibility (property,
plant and equipment/assets); and SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error is in
brackets.
*The signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
**The signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** The signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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sive  coefﬁcient  on  lagged  leverage  (0.6)  is  similar  to
those  obtained  for  literature  references  using  a  compara-
ble  methodology,10 such  as  Flannery  and  Rangan  (2006)  or
10 The three references mentioned use book leverage on US sam-
ples over long periods (1965--2001, 1971--2004 and 1977--2006,
respectively). We can mention some other references on European
samples, though using market leverages, except for Öztekin and
Flannery that use both market and accounting debt ratios. Thus,
the coefﬁcients obtained are 0.20--0.62 by González and González
(2008) for the countries included in our sample; 0.69--0.94 by
Öztekin and Flannery, for the countries included in our sample; 0.69
by Rubio and Sogorb (2011); 0.59--0.64 by González and González
(2012); and 0.31--0.72 by Rubio and Sogorb (2012). González and
González (2008) and Öztekin and Flannery (2012) analyze similarontrary  to  our  hypothesis  H.1a,  during  introduction,  our
esults  suggest  a  stronger  effect  of  tangibility  on  leverage.
uring  growth,  and  particularly  maturity,  the  coefﬁcient  is
ower  (similar  to  La  Rocca  et  al.,  2011).  This  is  likely  because
ature  ﬁrms  have  access  to  diverse  sources  of  ﬁnancing.  For
xample,  proﬁtable  ﬁrms  are  able  to  ﬁnance  the  increase
f  tangible  assets  with  internal  funds,  as  suggested  by  the
orrelation  matrix.
Size  exhibits  a  different  relation  with  leverage  through
he  life  cycle.  During  introduction,  the  coefﬁcient  is  nega-
ive.  The  positive  and  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcient  during  growth
nd  maturity  is  consistent  with  the  traditional  arguments  of
oth  the  TOT  and  the  POT.  Distress  costs  decrease,  accord-
ng  to  the  TOT,  while  debt  capacity  increases  in  larger  and
ature  ﬁrms  due  to  their  know-how,  notoriety  and  collat-
ral,  in  line  with  the  POT,  supporting  our  hypothesis  H.1a.
he  access  to  diverse  sources  of  funds  gives  ﬁrms  the  option
or  cheaper  sources  of  debt.  In  addition,  transaction  costs
ecrease  due  to  the  reduction  of  information  asymmetry.
A  Chow  test  was  applied  comparing  ﬁrst  the  three  life
ycle  stages,  and  then  each  stage  against  the  other  two.
he  highly  signiﬁcant  values  obtained  (untabulated)  for  all
p
a
p
(he  independent  variables  indicate  that  the  coefﬁcients  are
ifferent  across  the  stages.
Concerning  the  speed  of  adjustment,  our  comprehen-eriods (1995--2004 and 1991--2006, respectively). Both samples
re international, including the European ﬁrms taken in our sam-
le (except The Netherlands in the second work). Rubio and Sogorb
2011, 2012) and González and González (2012) analyze Spanish
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Table  5  Inﬂuence  of  the  next  target  leverage  on  ﬁrm  lever-
age. System  GMM.
Variables  Change:
Introduction
to  Growth
Change:
Growth  to
Maturity
TDEBTt−1 0.683*** 0.725***
[0.0119]  [0.0174]
PROFt+1 0.0468*** 0.0217
[0.00638]  [0.0154]
GROWTHt+1 0.00121  0.0161***
[0.000870]  [0.00256]
TANGt+1 0.0863*** 0.0736***
[0.0114]  [0.0154]
SIZEt+1 −0.00353** 0.0102***
[0.00169]  [0.00168]
Constant  0.0295  −0.0654
[0.0652]  [0.0607]
Industry  Eff. Yes  Yes
Country  Eff. Yes Yes
Time  Eff. Yes Yes
Obs.  395  1296
Firms  345  947
F Test  25,514  170.6
Sig.  F  Test  0  0
Hansen  Test  205.4  248.9
Sig.  Hansen  0.958  0.400
m2 −0.966  1.537
Sig.  m2 0.334  0.124
Notes: Regressions are estimated using the system GMM esti-
mator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. TDEBT
is book leverage (total debt/total assets); PROF is proﬁt-
ability (EBITDA/total assets); GROWTH is market to book
(market value of equity + debt in current liabilities + long-term
debt + preferred stocks − deferred taxes and investment tax
credit to total assets); TANG is tangibility (property, plant and
equipment/assets); and SIZE is the logarithm of total assets.
Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error is in
brackets.
*The signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** The signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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debt  and  those  who  increase  it,  explains  the  small  differ-Target  leverage  and  speed  of  adjustment  along  the  life  cycl
Chang  and  Dasgupta  (2009)  who  obtain  0.62,  and  Cook  and
Tang  (2010),  with  most  coefﬁcients  between  0.5  and  0.67.
The  column  2  (introduction)  indicates  a  coefﬁcient  of  0.537
for  Debtt−1,  which  implies  a  value  of  0.463  for  ˛.  As  a  result,
the  adjustment  to  the  target  leverage  is  the  highest,  sug-
gesting  a  lower  effect  of  transaction  costs  than  during  other
stages.  However,  growth  and  maturity  (columns  3  and  4)
exhibit  higher  coefﬁcients,  meaning  ˛  closer  to  zero  (0.294
and  0.339,  respectively)  and  hence  higher  transaction  costs.
The  coefﬁcients  suggest  different  levels  of  transaction  costs
in  the  three  stages  of  the  life  cycle,  remarkably  higher  dur-
ing  growth  in  comparison  with  introduction  and  maturity.
Thus,  our  results  do  not  support  our  third  hypothesis  with
regard  to  the  comparison  of  the  introduction  stage  with  the
other  two,  although  H.3  is  supported  by  the  reduction  of
transaction  costs  from  the  growth  stage  to  maturity.
In  Table  4,  we  compare  the  target  leverage  determinants
between  the  ﬁrms  that  change  and  those  that  remain  in  the
same  life  stage.  Moreover,  we  distinguish  the  change  from
introduction  to  growth  and  from  growth  to  maturity.  A  Chow
test  was  applied  comparing  the  ﬁve  groups  of  coefﬁcients,
and  then  the  coefﬁcients  obtained  for  the  change  from
introduction  to  growth  against  the  change  from  growth  to
maturity  (untabulated),  obtaining  highly  signiﬁcant  values
what  indicates  different  coefﬁcients.
For  ﬁrms  changing  stage,  proﬁtability  seems  to  play  a
more  relevant  role  as  a  negative  determinant  of  target  debt.
With  higher  information  asymmetry,  ﬁrms  have  more  difﬁ-
culties  to  obtain  debt,  in  the  line  of  the  POT  reasoning  and
the  results  found  by  Hirsch  and  Walz  (2011), therefore,  prof-
itable  ﬁrms  will  turn  to  capital  or  retained  earnings  in  higher
proportions  than  when  they  maintain  in  the  same  stage.
If  we  analyze  size,  we  can  observe  a  signiﬁcant  evolution
through  the  stages.  During  introduction,  the  relation  is  neg-
ative,  which  supports  the  POT  because  the  adverse  selection
problems  considerably  decrease  in  large  ﬁrms.  Then,  the
relation  is  not  signiﬁcant  during  the  transition  from  intro-
duction  to  growth  up  to  the  point  of  turning  positive  and
considerable  higher  during  growth.  The  TOT  considers  size
as  a  sign  of  the  ﬁrms’  strength  for  lenders,  in  parallel  with
assets  as  collateral.
The  lowest  speed  takes  place  when  ﬁrms  change  from
introduction  to  growth  (˛  =  0.260)  followed  by  those  chang-
ing  from  growth  to  maturity  (˛  =  0.296).  These  results
support  our  hypotheses  H.4a  and  H.4b  and  are  consistent
with  higher  information  asymmetries  increasing  transaction
costs  for  ﬁrms  in  transitions,  being  even  higher  costs  when
the  transition  is  from  introduction  to  growth.
In  addition,  the  change  in  the  life  cycle  stage  involves
new  strategies,  for  which  new  ﬁnancing  may  be  neces-
sary,  implying  different  and  more  difﬁcult  ways  to  access
to  the  market,  resulting  in  higher  transaction  costs.  A
change  of  stage  always  brings  about  riskier  strategies  and
decisions,  with  which  the  stakeholders  may  not  agree,  pro-
ducing  a  conﬂict  of  interest  that  noticeably  increase  the
transaction  costs.  Moreover,  asymmetric  information  can
affect  all  dealings  of  the  ﬁrm,  hindering  their  accomplish-
ment  or  increasing  their  cost.  For  example,  administrative,
ﬁrms during similar periods (1995--2003, 1995--2007 and 1995--2003,
respectively).
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o*** The signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
nforcement,  or  ﬁscal  procedures  may  be  delayed  by  several
onﬂicts.
The  coefﬁcient  in  the  second  column  suggests  that  the
trategies  or  transactions  made  by  a  ﬁrm  evolving  from  intro-
uction  to  growth  cause  distrust  in  the  market,  leading  to
igher  costs  in  accessing  additional  ﬁnancing.  Consistent
ith  Hovakimian  and  Li  (2009), ﬁrms  adjusting  to  pay  off
he  excess  of  debt  exhibit  lower  adjustment  costs.  The  pres-
nce  of  both  types  of  ﬁrms  in  this  group,  those  who  reducence  in  adjustment  costs  with  respect  to  ﬁrms  that  remain
n  maturity.11
11 We  can conﬁrm the lack of second-order serial correlation in
he two ﬁrst-difference residuals for ﬁrms remaining in maturity
nly from 5% instead of 10% as in the rest of the regressions.
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Table  6  Alternative  measure  of  leverage.  System  GMM  procedure.
Panel  A.  By-stage  determinants  of  leverage  --  LEV
Variables  All  ﬁrms  Introduction  Growth  Maturity
LEVt−1 0.649*** 0.616*** 0.775*** 0.612***
[0.0209]  [0.0174]  [0.0227]  [0.00267]
PROFt −0.116*** −0.162*** −0.188*** −0.299***
[0.0264]  [0.0295]  [0.0327]  [0.00222]
GROWTHt −0.00751** 0.000275  −0.00796* 0.0107***
[0.00380]  [0.00358]  [0.00452]  [0.000183]
TANGt 0.155*** 0.0693** 0.0612** 0.0474***
[0.0280]  [0.0270]  [0.0280]  [0.00157]
SIZEt 0.00742** −0.00657 0.0158*** 0.0242***
[0.00359]  [0.00556]  [0.00316]  [0.000529]
Constant 0.0239  −0.522  −0.0650  0.127***
[0.0978]  [1.038]  [0.0684]  [0.0354]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 11,616  2209  5564  3843
Firms 2684  1016  2012  1535
F Test  353.8  231.9  94.64  14,249
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0  0
Hansen Test  365.4  210.3  199.5  801.7
Sig. Hansen  0  0.174  0.303  0.126
m2 −0.0426  0.764  0.252  −0.958
Sig. m2 0.966  0.445  0.801  0.338
Panel B.  Determinants  of  leverage  according  to  the  stage  change
Variables Introduction:
Unchange
Change:  Intro
to  Growth
Growth:
Unchange
Change
Growth-Mat
Maturity:
Unchange
LEVt−1 0.554*** 0.795*** 0.576*** 0.705*** 0.687***
[0.00377]  [0.0159]  [0.00126]  [0.00559]  [0.000927]
PROFt −0.288*** −0.317*** −0.315*** −0.390*** −0.280***
[0.00468]  [0.0209]  [0.00168]  [0.00600]  [0.00125]
GROWTHt 0.00223*** 0.0207*** 0.00246*** 0.00772*** 0.0190***
[0.000459]  [0.00264]  [8.81e−05]  [0.000547]  [0.000114]
TANGt 0.327*** 0.0607*** 0.00865*** 0.0953*** 0.0687***
[0.0107]  [0.0228]  [0.00102]  [0.00970]  [0.00134]
SIZEt −0.0120*** 0.00442* 0.0149*** 0.0152*** 0.0129***
[0.00156]  [0.00268]  [0.000307]  [0.00105]  [0.000233]
Constant 0.582*** −0.124  0.0139  0.0226  0.125***
[0.164]  [0.445]  [0.0190]  [0.0264]  [0.0152]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 845  455  2708  1369  1691
Firms 441  396  1233  979  825
F Test  2.488e+06  2665  3.751e+06  3852  9.580e+07
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0  0  0
Hansen Test  351.4  126.1  810.2  551.1  626.1
Sig. Hansen  0.890  0.985  0.982  0.160  1
m2 0.156  −0.448  0.626  −0.520  −0.900
Sig. m2 0.876  0.654  0.531  0.603  0.368
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Table  6  (Continued  )
Panel  C.  Inﬂuence  of  the  next  target  on  ﬁrm  leverage
Variables  Change:  Introduction  to  Growth  Change:  Growth  to  Maturity
LEVt−1 0.659*** 0.828***
[0.0133]  [0.0165]
PROFt+1 0.0793*** 0.0445*
[0.0118]  [0.0268]
GROWTHt+1 −0.000785  0.00592*
[0.00126]  [0.00331]
TANGt+1 −0.0487*** 0.0768***
[0.0149]  [0.0196]
SIZEt+1 −0.0158*** −0.00289
[0.00251]  [0.00182]
Constant 0.264*** 0.114
[0.0829] [0.0763]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes
Time Eff.  Yes  Yes
Obs. 396  1309
Firms 345  953
F Test  210,769  132.7
Sig. F  Test  0  0
Hansen Test  216.8  263.3
Sig. Hansen  0.876  0.255
m2 −0.804  0.372
Sig. m2 0.421  0.710
Notes: Regressions are estimated using the system GMM estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. LEV is book leverage
(total liabilities/total assets); PROF is proﬁtability (EBITDA/total assets); GROWTH is market to book (market value of equity + debt
in current liabilities + long-term debt + preferred stocks − deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets); TANG is tangibility
(property, plant and equipment/assets); and SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard
error is in brackets.
* The signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** The signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** The signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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WThen,  we  perform  a  third  group  of  regressions  to  test  if
the  target  leverage  of  the  next  stage  acts  as  a  key  factor
to  explain  the  current  leverage  when  ﬁrms  have  changed
life  stage.  Table  5  indicates  how  some  drivers  of  the  next-
year  debt  target  are  acting  in  a  completely  different  way
than  the  same  drivers  of  the  current  target  to  explain  cur-
rent  debt.  This  is  the  case  of  proﬁtability  and  size  for  ﬁrms
that  change  from  introduction  to  growth;  meanwhile  pro-
ﬁtability  and  tangibility  are  different  for  the  next  change.
Using  the  Chow  Test  (untabulated)  we  have  checked  that
the  coefﬁcients  obtained  for  the  change  from  introduction
to  growth  are  signiﬁcantly  different  from  those  obtained  for
the  change  from  growth  to  maturity.
In  contrast  with  the  results  using  the  current  target  debt,
the  next-year  proﬁtability  factor  is  positively  related  to  debt
in  all  cases,  supporting  the  TOT.  Consistent  with  Ross  (1977),
considering  the  new  perspectives  offered  by  the  changes  of
stage,  higher  levels  of  debt  can  be  used  by  managers  to
signal  an  optimistic  future  for  the  ﬁrm.  In  addition,  more
proﬁtable  ﬁrms  can  hold  up  a  higher  leverage  ratio.
Concerning  our  third  hypothesis,  the  coefﬁcients  indicate
a  less  stable  target  debt  during  the  growth  stage  and  a  more
e
a
a
wtable  target  debt  during  maturity.  One  year  later,  growth
rms  will  have  a  quite  different  target  debt;  therefore,
he  ﬁrm  contracting  its  debt  with  a  long-term  perspective
ill  exhibit  a  higher  adjustment  to  the  current  target.  Our
esults  support  the  ﬁndings  by  Hovakimian  and  Li  (2009),
s  ﬁrms  changing  from  introduction  to  growth  would  make
djustments  closer  to  the  next-year  target  than  to  the  cur-
ent  target.  Firms  changing  from  growth  to  maturity  will
xhibit  more  stable  target  debt.  Therefore,  their  speed  of
djustment  is  similar  using  either  the  current  target  or  the
ext-year  target  (0.296  vs.  0.275).  This  conﬁrms  that  the
ebt  target  is  a strategic  decision  that  addresses  the  debt
olicy  during  several  years.
obustness  analyses
e  have  checked  the  robustness  of  our  results  by  replicating
stimations  with  a  different  measure  of  leverage,  by  using
n  alternative  classiﬁcation  of  ﬁrms  into  life  cycle  stages,
nd  by  including  several  additional  control  variables.  Again,
e  have  applied  the  Chow  test  to  check  that  the  differences
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Table  7  Alternative  measure  of  life  cycle  --  Dickinson.  System  GMM.
Panel  A.  By-stage  determinants  of  debt
Variables  Introduction  Growth  Maturity
TDEBTt−1 0.538*** 0.642*** 0.577***
[0.00652]  [0.0329]  [0.000776]
PROFt −0.112*** −0.183*** −0.196***
[0.00392]  [0.0346]  [0.000582]
GROWTHt −0.00742*** −0.00748** 0.000476***
[0.000597]  [0.00378]  [0.000106]
TANGt 0.152*** 0.0483* 0.0660***
[0.00870]  [0.0246]  [0.000884]
SIZEt −0.00644*** 0.0218*** 0.00502***
[0.00117]  [0.00256]  [0.000211]
Constant −0.741  −0.191*** 0.240***
[1.049]  [0.0714]  [0.0264]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff. Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 3420  3615  6058
Firms 1243  1691  1943
F Test  44,938  79.82  2.080e+07
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0
Hansen Test  417.7  289.6  1031
Sig. Hansen  0.860  5.23e−07  0.0178
m2 −0.257  1.419  1.297
Sig. m2 0.797  0.156  0.195
Panel B.  Determinants  of  debt  according  to  the  stage  change
Variables Introduction:
Unchange
Change:  Intro
to  Growth
Growth:
Unchange
Change
Growth-Mat
Maturity:
Unchange
TDEBTt−1 0.511*** 0.702*** 0.552*** 0.579*** 0.575***
[0.00617]  [0.0226]  [0.00201]  [0.0180]  [0.000281]
PROFt −0.0313*** −0.116*** −0.148*** −0.295*** −0.162***
[0.00295]  [0.0160]  [0.00207]  [0.0202]  [0.000265]
GROWTHt −0.00829*** 0.00847*** 0.0134*** 0.00578*** −0.000784***
[0.000567]  [0.00242]  [0.000356]  [0.00206]  [3.69e−05]
TANGt 0.209*** 0.238*** 0.181*** 0.154*** 0.178***
[0.00533]  [0.0280]  [0.00515]  [0.0243]  [0.000504]
SIZEt −0.00616*** 0.0203*** 0.0156*** 0.0150*** 0.00742***
[0.00101]  [0.00369]  [0.000491]  [0.00261]  [0.000145]
Constant 0.0760  −0.835** −0.153  −0.0774* −0.00298
[0.0889] [0.360]  [0.281]  [0.0465]  [0.00683]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 2049  456  1421  1409  3496
Firms 752  407  785  1027  1306
F Test  41,021  632.7  4.670e+07  261.4  7.943e+06
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0  0  0
Hansen Test  221.2  109.5  415.8  319.9  1005
Sig. Hansen  1  0.995  0.780  3.57e−10  0.902
m2 −0.192  −0.916  0.478  1.996  −1.111
Sig. m2 0.847  0.359  0.633  0.0459  0.267
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Table  7  (Continued  )
Panel  C.  Inﬂuence  of  the  next  target  on  ﬁrm  debt
Variables  Change:  Introduction  to  Growth  Change:  Growth  to  Maturity
TDEBTt−1 0.623*** 0.391***
[0.0208]  [0.00469]
PROFt+1 0.0714*** 0.0675***
[0.0130]  [0.00293]
GROWTHt+1 0.0229*** 0.000959**
[0.00258]  [0.000407]
TANGt+1 0.132*** 0.119***
[0.0236]  [0.00461]
SIZEt+1 0.00512  −0.00489***
[0.00386]  [0.000765]
Constant 0.573* 0.186***
[0.345]  [0.0698]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes
Time Eff.  Yes  Yes
Obs. 415  1322
Firms 376  978
F Test  2080  351,490
Sig. F  Test  0  0
Hansen Test  139.5  556.1
Sig. Hansen  0.998  0.192
m2 −0.926  2.938
Sig. m2 0.355  0.00331
Notes: Regressions are estimated using the system GMM estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. TDEBT is book leverage
(total debt/total assets); PROF is proﬁtability (EBITDA/total assets); GROWTH is market to book (market value of equity + debt in current
liabilities + long-term debt + preferred stocks − deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets); TANG is tangibility (property,
plant and equipment/assets); and SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error is in
brackets.
* The signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** The signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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between  the  coefﬁcients  obtained  for  different  groups  are
signiﬁcant  in  every  additional  robustness  analysis  (untabu-
lated).
Alternative  measure  of  leverage
Following  Welch  (2011),  we  determine  that  non-ﬁnancial
liabilities  should  be  considered  debt.  Hence,  our  proxy  for
leverage  is  the  ratio  of  total  liabilities  to  total  assets,  in
book  values.  The  results  are  very  similar  to  those  obtained
with  total  debt.  Differences  indicate  a  slightly  lower  speed
of  adjustment  along  the  life  cycle  stages  (Table  6,  Panel  A),
both  for  ﬁrms  remaining  in  the  same  stage  and  for  ﬁrms
changing  from  one  stage  to  another  (Panel  B).  This  result
suggests  that  operating  liabilities  adjust  toward  the  target  in
a  more  progressive  way.  In  addition,  we  can  appreciate  that
proﬁtability  is  a  better  driver  of  leverage  during  introduction
and  growth  whereas  tangibility  and  size  are  weaker  induc-
tors  of  debt,  mainly  during  growth  and  maturity.  The  lack  of
signiﬁcance  for  the  growth  coefﬁcient  during  introduction
and  the  lower  signiﬁcance  during  growth  are  consistent  with
growth  opportunities  exerting  opposite  effects  on  leverage
in  these  stages.  Finally,  debt  exhibits  different  target  deter-
minants  when  we  consider  the  next  year  target  (Panel  C),
f
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s
semarkably  in  the  case  of  proﬁtability,  tangibility,  and  size.
iven  that  traditional  theories  pay  little  attention  to  oper-
ting  debt,  differences  suggest  an  open  research  question
oncerning  the  use  of  different  sources  of  funds  along  the
rm  life  cycle.  The  stronger  effect  of  tangibility  as  a  deter-
inant  of  target  debt  is  consistent  with  the  role  of  tangible
ssets  as  collateral  in  obtaining  mainly  debt.
lternative  classiﬁcation  of  ﬁrms  into  life  cycle  stages
e  have  checked  that  our  main  results  do  not  change  when
e  use  the  whole  Dickinson  (2011)  model  to  classify  ﬁrms
nto  the  three  life  cycle  stages.  In  this  case,  the  signs  taken
y  operating,  investing,  and  ﬁnancing  cash  ﬂows  are  consid-
red  (Table  1).
We  observe  that  the  speed  of  adjustment  is  lower  dur-
ng  growth  followed  by  maturity  (Table  7,  Panel  A)  and  that
he  lower  speed  of  adjustment  is  found  for  ﬁrms  changing
rom  introduction  to  growth  (Panel  B).  The  same  patterns
re  maintained  in  the  coefﬁcients  of  the  target  leverage
actors  in  the  three  panels,  except  for  growth  opportunities
n  some  stages.  The  opposite  effects  of  growth  opportunities
upported  by  both  the  trade-off  and  the  pecking  order  rea-
oning  cause  variation  of  signs  and  signiﬁcance  depending
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Table  8  Results  after  controlling  by  institutional  factors.
Variables  All  ﬁrms  Introduction  Growth  Maturity
TDEBTt−1 0.587*** 0.527*** 0.706*** 0.680***
[0.0166]  [0.00305]  [0.0198]  [0.00757]
PROF −0.148*** −0.0333*** −0.173*** −0.168***
[0.0153]  [0.00145]  [0.0274]  [0.00616]
GROWTH 0.000544  −0.00287*** −0.00730*** 0.00952***
[0.00181]  [0.000230]  [0.00241]  [0.000438]
TANG 0.160*** 0.228*** 0.0978*** 0.0713***
[0.0205]  [0.00464]  [0.0220]  [0.00459]
SIZE 0.0162*** −0.0127*** 0.00965*** 0.0118***
[0.00158]  [0.000597]  [0.00269]  [0.000794]
cr −0.00970*** 0.0128** −0.00873*** −0.00520**
[0.00248]  [0.00615]  [0.00272]  [0.00221]
caseaefﬁciency  0.000318* 0.000317  0.000454** 7.58e−05
[0.000166]  [0.000415]  [0.000181]  [0.000155]
CRISIS 0.00914** 0.0268*** 0.00732  0.00705**
[0.00414]  [0.00341]  [0.00606]  [0.00345]
Constant −0.0406  −0.884  −0.130** −0.0755***
[0.0271]  [0.601]  [0.0584]  [0.0183]
Industry Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Time Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Legal Origin  Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Obs. 11,553  2189  5541  3823
Firms 2681  1013  2007  1532
F Test  158.8  29,591  93.63  445.5
Sig. F  Test  0  0  0  0
Hansen Test  359.1  510.5  218.1  590.6
Sig. Hansen 0.714  1  0.123  0.229
m2 1.351  0.325  1.213  −0.349
Sig. m2 0.177  0.745  0.225  0.727
Standard errors in brackets.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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forces.12 The  crisis  factor  shows  a  more  consistent  effect,
showing  a  positive  inﬂuence  on  leverage  across  the  life
cycle  stages,  though  signiﬁcance  is  weaker  (or  null)  in  some
cases.
12 The supply-side reasoning concerns the improvement of the dis-
position of creditors to extend credit and take risk in the presencen  the  life  cycle  stage,  but  also  on  the  subsample  of  ﬁrms
nalyzed.
dditional  control  variables
e  have  controlled  by  the  effect  of  some  legal  and  institu-
ional  factors  as  well  as  by  the  effect  of  the  crisis.  We  have
dded  the  following  control  variables:  creditor  rights,  legal
rigin  (English,  French,  German,  and  Scandinavian),  efﬁ-
iency  of  debt  enforcement,  and  crisis.  The  creditor  rights
re  measured  using  the  index  developed  by  LaPorta  et  al.
2008).  The  legal  origin  dummies  are  constructed  follow-
ng  LaPorta  et  al.  (2008).  Efﬁciency  of  debt  enforcement  is
eﬁned  as  the  present  value  of  the  terminal  value  of  the
rm  after  bankruptcy  costs  (Djankov  et  al.,  2008).  The  cri-
is  factor  is  a  dummy  variable  built  following  Laeven  and
alencia  (2013).  Our  results  show  that  all  the  patterns  for
peed  of  adjustment  remain  unchanged  and  almost  all  signs
nd  patterns  for  leverage  drivers  maintain  (Table  8).  Again,
rowth  opportunities  appear  as  the  less  stable  factor.  For
he  effect  of  creditor  rights,  legal  origin,  and  efﬁciency  of
o
c
d
rebt  enforcement  we  do  not  obtain  conclusive  results  as
oefﬁcients  show  changes  of  signiﬁcance  and  sign.  As  for
he  creditor  rights  factor,  previous  literature  is  not  conclu-
ive  either,  showing  positive  (González  and  González,  2008)
nd  negative  effects  (Cho  et  al.,  2014)  on  leverage.  The  pos-
tive  sign  during  introduction  would  be  consistent  with  the
upply-side  forces  whereas  the  negative  sign  during  growth
nd  maturity  would  be  consistent  with  the  demand-sidef better creditor protection. As regards the demand-side forces,
reditor protection increases the reluctance of corporations to use
ebt caused by the managers’ and shareholders’ concerns about
etaining control in case of ﬁnancial distress (Cho et al., 2014).
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behavior  changes  along  the  life  cycle,  whereas  the  selectionTarget  leverage  and  speed  of  adjustment  along  the  life  cycl
Conclusion
We  conclude  that  the  target  leverage  and  the  speed  of
adjustment  to  the  optimal  capital  structure  vary  across  the
life  cycle  stages  of  the  ﬁrms  in  a  study  using  a  panel  database
of  non-ﬁnancial  listed  ﬁrms  in  fourteen  European  countries
during  the  period  1990--2012.
To  distinguish  life  cycle  stages,  we  start  from  Dickinson’s
(2011)  innovative  methodology,  based  on  the  signs  of  oper-
ating,  investing  and  ﬁnancing  cash  ﬂows,  but  we  substitute
the  ﬁnancing  cash-ﬂow  part  by  an  alternative  criterion
based  on  a  combination  of  growth  and  risk  factors  to  sepa-
rate  the  ﬁrms  in  introduction  and  growth  from  the  mature
ﬁrms.
Taking  total  debt  to  assets  as  a  proxy  for  leverage,  we
have  analyzed  the  determinants  of  target  leverage  by  stage.
We  conclude  that  proﬁtability  and  tangibility  are  the  most
stable  drivers  from  introduction  to  maturity,  whereas  growth
opportunities  and  size  are  changing  but  relevant  determi-
nants.  Proﬁtability  has  a  negative  relation  along  the  life
of  a  ﬁrm,  less  inﬂuential  during  introduction.  The  nega-
tive  sign  supports  the  POT  during  the  three  stages,  and  the
remarkable  increase  from  introduction  to  growth  indicates
its  role  as  a  source  of  retained  earnings  supported  by  the
POT  too.  However,  the  factor  is  not  a  stronger  explanatory
factor  during  maturity,  what  suggests  an  offsetting  effect  of
the  reasons  posed  by  the  TOT  for  the  proﬁtability  factor  in
mature  ﬁrms.
Tangible  assets  have  a  positive  contribution,  in  line  with
its  effect  as  collateral  posed  by  the  POT,  being  this  factor
remarkably  relevant  during  introduction,  whereas  the  size
factor  is  positive  during  growth  and  maturity,  which  is  sup-
ported  by  both  the  TOT  and  the  POT  reasoning.  Therefore,
tangibility  and  size  obtain  positive  signs  but  only  size  evolves
across  the  stages  according  to  both  theories,  TOT  and  POT,
increasing  its  relevance  as  the  ﬁrms  grow  and  mature.  On  the
contrary,  tangibility  turns  into  a  weaker  explanatory  factor
as  other  factors  (such  as  size  or  growth  opportunities)  gain
relevance  in  subsequent  stages.
The  growth  opportunities  variable  exhibits  small
coefﬁcients  and  a  change  of  sign  from  growth  to  maturity,
suggesting  opposite  effects  derived  from  this  factor:
bigger  funding  needs  and  debt  capacity  in  contrast  with
generation  of  more  cash  ﬂows.  The  negative  coefﬁcient
during  introduction  and  growth  is  in  line  with  higher  infor-
mation  asymmetry  hampering  new  external  funding  (POT),
whereas  the  positive  relation  during  maturity  suggests  that
the  retained  earnings  produced  by  proﬁtable  ﬁrms  are
insufﬁcient  to  cover  the  additional  funding  needs.  In  sum,
concerning  the  prevalence  of  the  theories  along  the  three
stages  considered  of  the  life  cycle  of  the  ﬁrm,  the  results
on  the  determinants  of  target  leverage  partially  support
both  the  TOT  and  the  POT.
As  for  the  speed  of  adjustment,  our  results  indicate
a  high-low-high  pattern  across  the  life  cycle  stages.  Dur-
ing  introduction  and  maturity,  the  speed  of  adjustment  is
higher,  meaning  considerably  lower  transaction  costs.  Dur-
ing  growth,  quoted  ﬁrms  usually  enter  into  other  businesses
or  increase  their  investments  to  reach  a  higher  growth,  thus
increasing  the  asymmetric  information  and  hindering  the
access  to  capital  markets.  We  do  not  ﬁnd  support  in  general
for  the  TOT  (nor  the  residual  effect  of  the  POT)  as  regards
o
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he  evolution  of  the  speed  of  adjustment  across  the  stages,
s  the  higher  speed  during  the  introduction  stage  than  during
he  growth  stage  maintains  across  the  different  robustness
nalyses  performed.
A  lower  speed  of  adjustment  is  observed  in  ﬁrms  that
hange  life  stage  with  respect  to  those  remaining  in  the
ame  stage,  consistent  with  higher  asymmetric  information
nd  transaction  costs  associated  with  strategy  changes.  We
onclude  that  new  strategies  cause  frictions  on  the  market
ffecting  costs  and  capital  structure.  In  addition,  our  results
ndicate  a  lower  increase  of  costs  for  ﬁrms  changing  from
rowth  to  maturity  than  for  ﬁrms  changing  from  introduc-
ion  to  growth.  This  result  is  consistent  with  a  mixed  group  of
rms  concerning  adjustments  of  debt:  those  reducing  debt
nd  those  increasing  it,  considering  the  asymmetric  costs  of
oth  types  of  adjustment  (Hovakimian  and  Li,  2009).  There-
ore,  we  ﬁnd  strong  support  to  the  POT  in  respect  to  the
eduction  of  the  speed  of  adjustment  during  the  changes  of
tages  and  in  respect  to  the  more  intense  effect  when  the
rms  evolve  from  introduction  to  growth,  being  the  result
obust  to  the  alternative  speciﬁcation  of  debt,  the  alterna-
ive  deﬁnition  of  life  cycle  stages,  and  the  introduction  of
everal  control  variables.
Finally,  our  results  conﬁrm  that  ﬁrms  changing  from  one
ife  stage  to  another  use  long-term  targets.  Furthermore,
uring  the  change  from  introduction  to  growth,  the  adjust-
ent  to  the  next-year  target  is  faster  than  to  the  current
arget.  In  this  case,  factors  proxying  for  debt  target  suf-
er  relevant  changes  from  year  to  year,  and  debt  changes
re  likely  to  adjust  to  needs  expected  two  or  three  years
head.  By  contrast,  ﬁrms  changing  from  growth  to  matu-
ity  would  expect  more  stable  ﬁnancial  needs,  and  ﬁrms
re  able  to  perform  ﬁnancing  changes  in  shorter  periods.
herefore,  next-year  targets  do  not  improve  the  adjustment
peed.
Our  contribution  to  the  line  of  research  on  optimal  cap-
tal  structure  is  twofold.  First,  we  demonstrate  that  for
uropean  listed  ﬁrms  the  capital  structure  determinants  as
ell  as  the  speed  of  adjustment  to  target  levels  depend  on
he  stage  of  the  ﬁrm,  as  the  capital  structure  theories  play
ifferent  roles  along  the  life  cycle  stages  of  ﬁrms.  Further-
ore,  we  provide  evidence  for  differences  in  ﬁrms  changing
rom  one  stage  to  another,  both  in  targets  and  speed  of
djustment.  Second,  we  contribute  to  the  target  leverage
iterature  by  adding  a  new  explanatory  factor:  the  next-year
arget  debt.  Our  results  conﬁrm  that  the  next-year  target  is
lso  a  relevant  factor  to  explain  the  current  debt  and  the
djustment  behavior  of  the  ﬁrms  differs  between  different
tages.
Our  contributions  are  relevant  for  researchers  and  prac-
itioners  as  the  results  indicate  that  the  proportions  of  ﬁrms
lassiﬁable  into  the  different  life  cycle  stages  determine
he  interpretation  of  the  results  obtained  concerning  the
actors  driving  both  capital  structure  targets  and  speed  of
djustment.  Therefore,  researchers  should  pay  much  more
ttention  to  the  sample  selection  because  analyzing  a  group
ith  ﬁrms  in  different  stages  of  life  is  likely  to  result  in  non-
igniﬁcant  or  unstable  coefﬁcients  for  those  factors  whosef  by-stage  samples  avoids  the  offsetting  effect  of  those
actors,  contributing  to  identify  the  origin  of  some  mixed
ffects  found  in  the  capital  structure  literature.  On  the
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ther  hand,  practitioners  should  be  aware  of  the  life  cycle
tage  a  ﬁrm  is  framed  in  and  the  differential  conditions  that
avor  or  limit  the  capital  structure  decisions.
The  conﬁrmation  of  the  Dickinson’s  model  as  a  good  proxy
or  assigning  ﬁrms  into  the  proper  life  cycle  stage  is  also  rel-
vant  for  both  researchers  and  practitioners.  As  in  the  case
f  capital  structure,  a  good  number  of  business  decisions
hould  be  taken  consciously  of  the  changing  (internal  and
xternal)  conditions  across  the  stages.  For  example,  ﬁnan-
ial  managers  could  check  the  assignment  of  their  ﬁrms  into
he  life  stage  by  this  model  in  order  to  compare  their  ﬁrms’
apital  structure  against  that  part  of  the  industry  (or  against
ome  speciﬁc  ﬁrms)  in  the  same  stage.  Taking  into  consider-
tion  our  second  contribution,  that  conﬁrms  the  long-term
laniﬁcation  of  relevant  capital  structure  changes,  ﬁnancial
anagers  could  contrast  their  ﬁrm’s  current  capital  struc-
ure  with  those  of  ﬁrms  in  the  next  stage  they  plan  to  evolve
o  in  the  next  future.  Thus,  managers  could  anticipate  some
imitations  and/or  advantages  to  be  arisen  when  adjusting
he  capital  structure  to  face  the  challenges  meaning  invest-
ent/disinvestment  in  the  new  stage.
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Panel A. Correlation analysis
TDEBT PROF GROWTH TAN G SIZ E
TDEBT 1
PROF 0.00 11 1
GROWTH –0.093 8 –0 .161 8 1
TAN G 0.29 28 0.1835 –0.140 2 1
SIZE 0.27 68 0.37 1 –0.256 9 0.2314 1
Panel B. VIF factors 
Variable All samp le
1/VIF VIF 
SIZE 1.25 0.80
PROF 1.18 0.85
GROWTH 1.08 0.92
TAN G 1.08 0.93
Mean VIF 1.15eferences
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